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ON NOT BEING ASHAMED OF THE GOSPEL:
PARTICULARITY, PLURALISM, AND VALIDATION
John Howard Yoder

A standard account of the problem of validation considers intelligibility and
identity as incompatible alternatives in a zero-sum context. The more the
identity of a community or a set of ideas is specifiably or particularly Christian, the less capable, it is held, is that community or that set of ideas of
communication to others. If on the other hand ideas are so formulated as to
be communicable to others, they have less to say that the hearers do not
already know. This paper argues that said disjunction is refuted by the concept
and by the track record of Gospel; it is a genre of communication which is
at once particular and communicable, by virtue of the communicators' uncoerced and noncoercive submission to the host culture.

From prehistoric tribal cultures to the age of the early classic philosophers,
our modern notion of transtribal "validation" would not have been pertinent. The
truth which any presocratic sage exposited was that of his own community. Argument, proverbs, epic, drama celebrated the values underlying one's own language,
one's own mores and social structures. There was no other place to stand.
When travel and social change challenged the self-evident quality of a
given community's norms, there were a few logically possible recourses.
Classical thinkers tried them. One recourse is to analyze language. We define
"justice" by disengaging socratically what we mean by calling a man "just".
That opens up a set of possible paths, of which one is Plato's vision of pure
ideas. The "validity" of the "ideas" is invulnerable, behind the mental distillation process which separates them from only relative "appearances."
The other end of the scale of "linguistic" answers shades from the sophists
to the cynics. These scoffers show Plato and Aristotle how arbitrary are the
definitions they claim to find deep in the language. They play with the
malleability of language. They demonstrate the various prices to be paid for
the diminishing reliability of our claim that our concepts can be unpacked by
simply analyzing our usage, so as to provide adequate instruments of shared
discernment and accountability.
Both ends of the scale from Platonism to cynicism are still unself-critically
language-dependent and community-dependent. Plato's distillation process took
off from a monolingual culture. Every "idea" disengaged by socratic questioning
is borne by a word, assumed to be univocal, so that its meaning can meaningfully
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be pursued, in particular language. The socratic questioner assumes that under
proper prodding the word will yield an univocal definition. The socratic investigation of "what we mean by calling a man 'just''' has to presuppose, without
being self-conscious about it, a particular language located in a particular culture.
Even the cynics go on living and debating within the linguistic culture whose
transcendent pretensions they have undercut. Once the culture's monolithic
self-confidence is undermined, none of those arguments work. l
If the simplest way to describe the conditions for an univocal language is
to describe the monolingual village, then the shape of the challenge to selfevident univocality is most adequately modeled by the young person's leaving
home for the distant city. It is in terms of personal cultural development that
one can best seek to interpret the embarrassment of particularity, which drives
people to seek validation beyond themselves. 2 The child moving from the
family to the public school, the student discovering the classics, any person
first learning a foreign language makes the same discovery. The fundamentalist discovering that the Bible can be read as one reads any other literature,
or as history, does it in another way. The counselee experiencing the
psychiatrist's capacity to find threatening garbage in his or her own subconscious will in yet another way surrender to the sovereignty of the wider world.
The syndrome is regular, even though that wider world is each time just one
more subculture. Some of the "wider worlds," in fact, though they overpower
the person entering them, are narrower in terms of the agenda they handle,
or smaller in terms of the number of people they speak for, than was the
provincial culture from which a person came.
The youth discovering a wider world tends to assume that since that particular world had not been there in that particular shape thirty or 100 years
before, therefore the foundation-shaking, liberating encounter with a new set
of doubts and certainties, which he/she has just gone through, is an unprecedented experience. It matters that we be reminded that in its shape, though
not in its substance, the experience is perennial. There is always a wider world
claiming that its truths are self-evident. As we shall see, that was the case in
the first century. It is not a new contribution of "modernity".
The search for foundations, the urge to find some argument, some mental
move, some court of appeal beyond appeal, is thus a learned personal psychic
defense against the constantly repeated experience of being overpowered by
a wider world. It is psychologically natural, but by the nature of things it is
insatiable and logically unrealistic.
The psychological and sociological momentum which makes the respectively "wider world" more convincing is not derived from rational demonstrations (where would one stand to deliver them?) but from the social experience
of growth or migration from the world of one's past toward the wider, or more
accepting, or more complex, or more tolerant, or more decisive, or wealthier
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world into which one has moved. Narrowness is associated with parental
authority; breadth with the teacher who has liberated one therefrom.
Behind all of these maneuvers there is the fear of vulnerability, a cringing
before the danger that we may be told by an audience in that wider world
that they do not believe us. We want what we say not only to be understandable, credible, meaningful. ... We want people to have to believe us. We
hanker for patterns of argument which will not be subject to reasonable doubt.
We are impressed by the power to convince which we see exercised by
demonstrations in mathematics and logic, in the natural sciences, and in
documented history ... and we want our claims about God or morality to be
similarly coercive. We think that truth must somehow be made irresistible,
because that is the way in which the small world in which we grew up taught
us what the rules are, and that is how the larger world we since moved into
imposed itself on us. We become "apologetic," ready to decrease the vigor
of our claims, if that will decrease their vulnerability to rejection.
To say it another way, the hunger for validation is a hunger for power. We
want people to have to believe what we say. We therefore seek to learn from
them what the warrants would be to which they would yield. Yet if in so
doing we ratify the truth criteria they already hold, what have we then to tell
them? Or if we articulate our claims in the language of a world they do not
inhabit, why should they listen? The more honestly we face up to the fact of
diversity between cultures, the more frankly we acknowledge change and
conflict within our own, the deeper becomes the embarrassment of particularity, and the farther out range the searches for "foundations".
It would be demanding but perhaps fruitful exercise to seek to itemize all the
possible "apologetic" modes of approximation to transtribal "validation" there
might be. Here I shall limit myself, after this amateur preface, to elucidating one
specific alternative stance, whose shape seems to me to be different from the
others at one point. To do so I propose to walk through a thin sampling of the
recent inhouse conversation, among persons doing historical an moral theology in a Christian setting,3 as that conversation bears upon the notion of
validating particular meanings, and sets the scene for the alternative I propose.
George Lindbeck's work The Nature of Doctrine 4 has been recognized as
a strong statement of one possible answer. He tells us that "doctrine" articulates, from within a community's acceptance of is own identity, the coherence
with which that community assumes and continues its own history. "Doctrine"
thus understood has more to say than what Lindbeck calls "expressivism"; it
makes verifiable statements based on more than "attitude." But it renounces
claims to describe "the way things really are" in a way that would transcend
community-dependency, or that could negate a priori the contradictory readings of observers in some quite different society. This acceptance of one's
own limits may be read as not facing the challenge of universality.
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James Gustafson does read it that way. He attacks the matter directly in a
recent paper.s He criticizes a number of contemporary writers, of whom
Lindbeck is guilty of being the most clear. Gustafson describes theological
knowledge as a null-sum game in which we must choose between authenticity
and intelligibility, and Lindbeck has made the wrong choice. So have the
"narrative theologians".
To these particularists, whom he calls "sectarian," Gustafson ascribes sociological, philosophical, and theological shortcomings. He does not (in this
paper) elucidate these reproaches in depth on the basis of any documented
analysis of what these authors have all written. He rather deduces the reproaches a priori from the above-stated null-sum disjunction, even though at
the end of his paper he grants that the disjunction is "too simple."
Gustafson had made almost the same point four years earlier, quoting
approvingly an old statement of Alasdair MacIntyre: "Either [moral theology]
will remain within the theological closed circle: in which case it will have
no access to the public and shared moral criteria of our society. Or it will
accept those criteria: in which case it may well have important things to say,
but these will not be distinctively Christian."6
Gustafson does not elaborate on what might in his view count as solid
criteria to verify or falsify "intelligibility". We must gather from his silence that
he assumes they are self-evidently abroad in the university and in popular lay
culture. 7
There are good reasons to take as representative this statement of our issue.
Gustafson has stated the argument simply and starkly, in prominent places.
He has done it in the realm of ethics, and (once, although only glancingly8)
he has named me as representing it for him. That does not mean that either
Gustafson or I would consider him to have invented the problem. He assumes
that it is a classical difficulty.
Gustafson thereby joins the line of academic apologetes since
Schleiermacher, who believe that there is in the world around us just one
"public" and commonly accessible meaning system, and that it will be of
service, both to the Christian tradition and to contemporary doubters, that we
restate the former in such a way as to make sense to the latter.
In so doing he has implemented, without recognizing that it might need to
be argued,9 the standard epistemological context of establishment lO :
1) There is assumed to be "out there" a singly publicly accessible system for
validating statements of fact as being (at least) meaningful and (perhaps,
idea 11 y) as "true".
2) It is further assumed that that system can also validate statements about
value or morality. Accepting the demands of that system is a prerequisite
for what Mcintyre (1963) had called, with Gustafson's approval, having
"important things to say."
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3) It is further assumed that in any given setting it is possible to ascertain
by empirical readings, whether scientific or impressionistic, what that
normative public meaning framework is. For the Gustafson of ETP it is a
cosmology dominated by the natural sciences and a culture just now
coming to be concerned about the ecological crisis. He appears to believe
that in this magnum opus he has resolved the challenge of particularity in
an original way, one which especially befits our present cultural challenge.
To critique that claim or that book is not my theme here. II
4) By definition the notion of "public and shared criteria" is a true platitude,
self-validated if trusted by everyone, and self-defeating if questioned by
anyone. Thereby it partakes of the same self-confident ambivalence which
regularly marks appeals to "nature," "self-evidence," and "consensus."

The above sampling should suffice to characterize the dominant debate
about the ability to communicate to or be validated by "the wider world,"
and to illustrate the limits of the debate. I suggest that the standard polar
account is not merely caricatured, and exaggerated, but illogical. In ordinary
rationality, intelligibility and authenticity condition each other mutually.
They are not alternatives which one could choose between. More important
for my present concern, that statement of the issue omits one important, quite
different option. The suggestion I propose to elucidate here is that the notion
of "Evangel" or "Good News" represents a specific perspective on the problem of particularity, one to which the standard surveys of methodological
spectra have not attended. I propose to call that other option "evangelical,"
but with the recognition that my use of that widely-abused adjective will need
to be specified.
I should note one prefatory claim on the formal level, common knowledge
to philosophers yet still needing to be said in the milieu where this review
began. It is that the search to avoid particularity by some mental move of
definition or some kind of empirical data-gathering is by the nature of things
a wasted effort. It cannot be done, whether we analyze the challenges with
psychological, sociological, or linguistic tools. There is no non-particular
place to stand. Any claim to have access to a kind of truth which is by
definition the same for everyone is epistemologically pre-modern. 12 The theory of truth exemplified by and assumed ever since Lessing, which can claim
to put the "particularity" of others in a box only because it thinks that its own
"necessary truths of reason" are universal, is in fact no less in a box itself.
This does not mean that the games people engage in, in the course of the
effort to correct for bias or to make sense to others, are pointless. Constructs
like "viewing from nowhere" or "ideal observers" can be of some use for
some internal self-critical purposes, as long as their fictional status is kept in
mind. What they cannot do is guarantee that someone else in particular ought
to believe me.
Yet the desire for some kind of transtribal validation cannot be wrong. It
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testifies to respect for those to whom one wishes to communicate. It testifies
to the strength of anyone's conviction that what one believes (even though
all such belief has been arrived at historically, in one's own setting and
language) is not only true only for oneself.
We need therefore to reconstruct the nature of particularity as a truth challenge. We must abandon the chhnerical vision of a set of semantic or definitional moves which would transcend the limits of one's own identity,
rationally coercing assent, without taking account of a particular interlocutor
or a specific dialogical setting. We must relinquish the dream of a set of social
moves which would find or construct a "world" so big as to enclose everyone
else. 13
Yet we must not abandon the claim that the validity of what we believe is
founded on grounds more solid than whim, flipping a coin, accident, or
provincial bias. Instead of seeking to escape particular identity, what we need,
then, is a better way to restate the meaning of a truth claim from within
particular identity.
The word with which the early Christians did that was Evangel, "Good
News." To unfold the implications of this term 14 will demonstrate the inadequacy of the polar formulation of the problem with which we began. IS
The word "news" refers to a kind of information which originates in a
particular setting. It is without embarrassment contingent, historical. (It is
often narrative, too, but to make much of that as a special additional issue in
our contemporary discussion would be a red herring.) Others need to know
about it, but they will know about it only if told by persons who themselves
were witnesses to the event, or who had learned about it before by being told.
The only information which is not thus received from a witness is the utterly
particular new insight which an individual comes up with, however that might
happen (dream? vision? audition? hallucination? intuition?), and that too is
news when the next person hears it.
Next, "news" refers to information which is communicable. It does in fact
get communicated to someone else. There is no more public act than to
announce good news. By the nature of the case news is not esoteric or exotic.
It can be communicated in the language of any addressee. It is here that
Gustafson's pejorative descriptions, according to which any theology which
avows its particularity "becomes incorrigible," "marginalized," or "sectarian," or his use of the nouns "fideism," "confessionalism," and "ghetto," are
farthest from the truth.
Not as a detour but as an apt illustration, it may help to look more closely
at one example from among those inapt characterizations. The "ghetto" in
European experience was not a place into which Jews chose to retreat, in
order to be safe or to be kosher, or because Gentiles could not understand
them. The ghetto-dwellers did have a language of their own-two of them,
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in fact, one to read their scriptures and one for family life-but they also
spoke the italian, the german, or the polish of the city around them. They
spoke it well enough to do business and to represent a cultural challenge. By
the third generation in a new host setting they spoke the gentiles' language
well enough to serve the host culture as scribes, doctors, and traders, even
though they still lived in the ghetto.
It was the gentile establishment, not Jewry, who walled off the ghetto, to
defend itself against the cultural threat of the Jews' dissonant, often more
energetic and more creative life style. We may take that as a sort of unintended parable of our problem. Something similar is true, mostly though not
always, of the Christian minorities called "sectarian" by establishment theologians. 16 The centuries-long exclusion of minority Christians from civil involvement and from the university has been the result not of the free churches'
seeking isolation, or of their running away from ambiguity, but of their being
excluded, by custom and law, at the insistence and in the interest of the
dominant churches. That lasted until Roger Williams and William Penn demonstrated another possibility, namely that despite (or in fact thanks to) their
"minority" status and their dissident, non-coercive ethic, they could provide
decisive social and even political leadership.
We can set aside, therefore, as counterfactual, efforts to characterize from
outside someone else's view as being a priori incapable of communication.
We should rather ask what in principle are the logical and linguistic conditions of the communicability of "news," which is always community-conditioned, to a given receptor culture, which is always outside of that community
conditioning.
This question cannot be asked about the world as a whole; there is no
"world as a whole." There is not even a single "modem secular culture" to
speak to. This is therefore an empirical question, needing to be asked and
answered each time locally. It cannot be answered by a merely mental move
of redefinition, dilution, distillation, or translation, made outside the concrete
encounter between message-bearers and receptors.
That news should be accredited as "good" by a receptor culture requires
first that it be present there, in forms which make sense there. The first words
of one of the apostolic documents called "Gospel" said it most formally: "the
Logos became flesh and camped among us." Evangel has to submit-wants
to submit-vulnerably to the conditions of meaning of the receptor culture.
We believe "news" when we hear it because those who tell it know whereof
they tell. They are accredited by their status as witnesses, not because we run
their report through our a priori grid.
The Logos dwelt in a tent, not in a castle, nor in a self-contained motor
home fabricated elsewhere. If the Logos had not chosen this kenosis, there
would have been no message received. In so doing the Logos does not become
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less authentically itself; for to impart meaning is the nature of Logos. Again
there is no null-sum choice between identity and communication.
What accredits news as "good" is that it enables or even commands a
wholeness or fullness, a validation or a flourishing, not actualized in its
absence. It cannot be imposed by authority, or coercively. It is rendered null
when assent is imposed. Nor can it be esoteric, reserved for specially inducted
hearers.
The reasons which count to move hearers to accept the "news" as "good"
cannot already be provided by "public and shared criteria" already present in
every culture, for then no news would be needed, or possible. Nor can they
be stipulated from outside the setting by the bearer of the message. The
"reasons which count" are present in the intrasubjective communication setting, by virtue of the fact that the news bearers have entered the scene, submitting to the language of the host culture, articulating and incarnating their
values in the neighbors' terms. That vulnerability to the host community's
criteria is the courage of the witness.
I have not bypassed the problem of validation, nor made it simpler, by this
description. I have shown that it is multidimensional, but this complexity is
more true, and my phrasing of the meaning of validity more adequate, than
Gustafson's simpler picture.
In the setting as thus described, we must then put a threefold question about
valid communication:
-is the content of what is "said" in the new setting faithful to its origin?
This is like a fuller form of asking whether a proposition is "true";
-is the transition into the "flesh" of the receptor culture accurate? This is
like checking the accuracy of translation from one language to another. No
two sentences in two languages can be absolutely identical, but a translation
can be adequate l7 ;
-is the "enfleshment" in the host setting authentic, non-imperial, uncoerced?

The Fourth "Good News" author fixed the parameters of this validation in
terms of the host setting, by saying of the Logos "he came into his own" or
"he came to his own people." The bearers of good news do not concede that
the new setting they enter is alien. They do not let gnosticism in the first
century or Gustofson in ours stipulate that in addressing their neighbors they
are out of their league. They claim even worlds yet unreached as part of the
Logos' creation. That claim encompasses even the rebellious powers-to mix
metaphors and apostles-under whose dominion humankind currently suffers.
The "news" is not public only in a formal sense: its substance as well is of
the ordinary world, not mysterious. Jesus announces in God's name that new
ways of handling money, power, status, and enemies-all public, political
agenda-will henceforth be possible and will be demanded because God's
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rule is now real. This is not privileged information about the inner workings
of the Godhead, not about essences or emanations, nor insider secrets about
the soul. The news is about a man leading a social movement, out in the open,
which so threatens the authorities that he is killed-a response no gnostic
secret could have had-yet his movement goes on. It culminated a peoplebuilding story as old as Abraham, in whose name all the nations are to be
blessed.
Yet what Jesus said and represented in that common language was counterintuitive, subversive, and costly. He demanded of his hearers a response
of metanoia and a new start in another direction. Yet it was neither esoteric
nor hard to understand.
The Word's "coming to his own" cannot be triumphal. "His own did not
receive him," the same author went on to write. The creatures are free to
rebel. The workers in the vineyard are free to kill the heir. Jesus makes on
his hearers' assent no claims but by the truth inherent in his words and his
being there at their mercy. Rejection, according to the "news" brought by
Jesus and his witnesses, is part of validation. This is where the
foundationalists cannot follow. They want to tailor their message for a "world
out there" which they trust will be willing to and will in fact have to listen,
reasonably, as long as our tongue is not alien or odd. The Good News of the
Logos, on the other hand, accepts as the price of its communicability that it
must suffer at the hands of the addresses. Readiness to bear their hostility is
part of the message. IS
One way to understand the hankering for a way around particularity with
which we began is the cultural memory of the privileged status of establishment. Since Augustine called on Caesar to bring the Donatists back into the
fold, the ability to impose assent was assumed to be a mark of the truth. Only
grudgingly have the leaders of Christendom yielded their ability to coerce.
The constructive theologians of our academic establishment would be horrified by the notion of assent's being imposed by the state; yet their definitional
moves still project the assumption that they want to be able so to restate the
claims for belief that every reasonable reader will have no choice but to agree.
The backing of the civil arm, which was not working anyway, has been
renounced; yet one still wants one's affirmations not be vulnerable to dissent.
Any such announcement is subject to diversities of appropriation within
history. When the early Christians gave currency to the label "good news" as
designating a genre of literature, many such texts were circulating. Numerous
were judged edifying; finally four were canonized. Particularity and pluralism
are thus from the outset not an embarrassment but part of being historical.
There is no way some one set of neutral public criteria could bypass this, or
should want to.
Evangel must then include a component of diversity, critique and conflict,
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not by accident or inadvertence or error, or bad manners, but by the nature
of things. It will unmask idols. It will demythify the claim of any community
of meaning to speak for the whole of humanity. Every "wider world" we can
find is smaller than the globe, smaller than it claims to be. Every self-styled
speaker for a new age is elitist, every self-styled liberator is oppressive, every
one of the Powers is rebellious. The idea that "theology should resist the
clamor ... for what is currently fashionable and immediately intelligible,"
which Gustafson cites with such repugnance from George Lindbeck, is the
dictate of simple honesty. It is also what Gustafson does when some "current
fashion" does not convince him.
My above description of formal criteria for "news" has bypassed the simplest descriptive answer. What it means for "news" to be accredited as "good"
is first, functionally, defined by the fact that when some witness speaks it
someone else hears it, and assents to it, joining the community which bears it.
"Those who received him he empowered to become God's children." Without leaving their own world, the addressees enter the community of the
witnesses who first had crossed the border in the other direction. Each world
expands to encompass part of the other. The empowerment for this new
community comes neither from those receivers' having fled their own world
nor from the witnesses' having annexed it. Nor is it derived from the
witnesses' having obtained correct information about how to modify their
message in order to approach the receptor world. What "they who received
Him" (in the next sentence John slips from the third person to the first) have
received is not an epistle, nor a line of argument. It is the simple historical
presence of Logos himself enfleshed in their (our) midst, so that they could
let their story be incorporated in his.
Once come into the world, once enfleshed, the "true light that enlightens
everyone" was utterly and irrevocably particular. The Prologue to the Fourth
Gospel blends without transition from the entire cosmos into something as
incorrigibly local, particular as the baptism of John. Yet it is wrong to ask
how it was or is or should be "distinctive," as did Gustafson's quote from
MacIntyre above. To make "distinctiveness" a value criterion is to measure
the truth value of meaning system A in terms of the other systems (whether
B or C or N or X) that happen to be around, from which is supposed to differ.
That is a method mistake. Some of the neighboring systems may be very
much like it. Some of them may be historically derived from it, which is true
of most of the post-Christian value systems in the West. To ask that Christian
thought be unique is nonsense. What we should ask of Christian statements
is that they be specifically or specifiably Christian, i.e., true to kind, authentically representing their species. Whether a specifiably Christian statement
is "distinctive" depends on the other guy. That cannot be made a criterion of
authenticity.
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"God is not a Christian God for Christians only," Gustafson concluded his
"anti-sectarian" paper, as if that were an argument on his side. That is what
the first Evangelists were saying: the Logos that has become particular (sarx)
in Jesus is the light that illuminates everyone. I have been saying that Evangel, by presenting an answer sui generis to the challenge of validation, refutes
the disjunction between integrity and intelligibility; each is the other's prerequisite. Now I must proceed to deny as well the related disjuction between
the particular and universal. Evangel is by definition, not by coincidence or
fluke, the alternative to the epistemology of establishment, which seeks to
adjust one's "own" knowledge to the conditions of validity already dominating the "wider world." Evangel refutes, not by methodological manipulation or
sleight of hand but by its irreducible presence and its historical track record, the
notion that a thinner message would carry farther, or that concern for intelligibility would be best served by an a priori readiness to have less to say.
The ground for the transcultural intelligibility of the meaning of Jesus is
not an a priori semantic move made by methodologically preoccupied intellectuals (or apologetically concerned missionaries, for that matter). It is a set
of first century events, which some of its interpreters call Incarnation. "Incarnation" is not first a concept in communication theory; it is the code word
for the uniquely theocentric palestinian jewish man Jesus, communicating
God to us.
The above exposition should suffice to make my argument clear. If the
argument is valid, it opens up two other important derivative questions, which
I here note as a sort of afterword. To name them, though I shall not pursue
them, may clarify my point.
On one hand, so to speak "behind" us, there is the ontological problem.
Does an epistemology of Evangel presuppose some specific (remember that
it need not be distinctive) understanding of what Kind of God can thus reveal
himself? Of course it must, somehow. For some systems of thought God is
ineffable, and for others He (or She, or It) is self-evident. In the former case
no evangel would be possible and in the latter none would be needed. This
question would lead us to review the classical trinitarian debates and the high
scholastic discussions of communicable versus incommunicable attributes.
HistoricalloyaIty to the old narrators and prophets who caB God JHWH, and
to Jesus who told his followers to call him ABBA, might very well create
problems for some of the depersonalizing and departicularizing moves being
proposed today in the name of "construction" or "progress. "19
Yet that is not a new or an alien challenge. To meet that kind of challenge
is intrinsic to the evangelical claim, and the apostolic witnesses met it
repeatedly from the very start. The canonical NT contains at least five
extensive passages testifying to how they handled it, already in the first two
generations;
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John 1: 1-14: Jesus and the Logos cosmology;
Hebrews 1:1-2:18: Jesus and the angels;
Colossians I: 15-2:23: Jesus and religious cosmology;
Rev 4: 1-5:4: Jesus and the scroll of destiny;
Phil 2:1-13: Jesus and the pride of Adam/Prometheus.

Five authors, in five languages, five settings, addressing five host cultures,
took on the challenge of a new world and proclaimed Jesus' sovereignty. They
did not flee the encounter with their contemporary world's version of process
ontology; not did they grant that it represented a "wider world" whose standards they had to kowtow to. They rather faced its challenge, assumed its
language, and swallowed it up, transcended it.20
The evangelical strategy does not accept being walled into a ghetto by the
outside world. Not only does it accept the language of the environs: it seizes
it, expropriates it, and uses it to say things that could previously not have
been said in its prior language; nor could they have been said by anyone else
using the wider world's language. It proclaims the God of Abraham as no
less the God of the philosophers; it does so not by filtering abrahamic language through philosophical funnels, but by pre-empting the philosophers'
language in order to say with it things they had thought could not be said. It
refuses to be submitted for validation to the canons of intelligibility or credibility that were in force before it happened.
On the other hand, "before" us so to speak, there lies the apologetic problem. What it is that makes people believe, once the witness is en fleshed in
their midst? What counts as a warrant to convince them of whatever it is that
they come to believe? Or for that matter, what is it that people need to come
to believe? Is there one indispensable propositional content? One indispensable existential or emotional experience?
My above description of the phenomenon of evangel was intentionally
formal, social. I have discussed neither how much creedal substance, how
many information bits about God and the world need to be transmitted, nor
what it is that moves people to say "yes" to that. These questions matter, but
they are not the place to start.
It will be no surprise that to these questions too my short answer must be
that the responses will and must be empirical and particular. There is no
reason that for all possible addressees the reasons for joining the Jesus movement should have been (in fact) or should need (in principle) to be the same. 21
This is not the place to itemize the varieties of social and psychological
motivations which were in fact effective in moving people to membership in
the early messianic synagogues. All that should be needed for present purposes is to clarify two observations.
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One is that the model of "validation" we are most used to thinking about,
that of intellectuals coming to be convinced of the truth of propositions in
God language, on the basis of rational appeal to generalizable warrants, was
not dominant most of the time in the first centuries of the apostolic enterprise,
nor has it been since then. 22 People joined the movement for all kinds of
reasons, and they explained it in numerous ways.
The other observation is that that was all right. There is nothing embarrassing for the bearer of evangel-as there is for scholastics-about the pluralism
of styles, modes, and grounds of either proclamation or conversion. It is part
of the nature of Evangel not only to speak many languages but to enter history
and the soul through more than one door.23 What needs to be tested is the
congruence between the shape of believing, and of believing speech and
believing behavior, in new times and places, and what it had meant before.
To test that congruence is a task for the multiple roles of leaders and servants
in the discerning community.24
There are wrong reasons for joining the movement, and there are truly false
ideas, "heresy," by these must be denounced and evaluated holistically, in a
congregational/conversational process, from within the meaning of the witness, not extrinsically in terms of some autonomously apologetic logic. The
procedures of evaluation come after, not before, assent. They operate within
the community's story, not from Athens or "from nowhere."
Neither of these still open questions, neither the "ontological" one "behind"
the bearing of good news, nor the "rhetorical" one "ahead" of the witnesses,
is intrinsically intractable. Neither needs as far as I can see to be resolved
before my argument can stand. The argument is simply that the dominant
post-enlightenment disjunction between intelligibility and validity is belied
by the undeniable historical reality of good news being borne from one world
to another. If the post-enlightenment epistemological grid should continue to
refuse to admit this category, that calls into question not the historical reality
but the grid.

Department of Theology,
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NOTES
1. For a strong contemporary statement of the puzzle, cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Why is
the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating?" Hastings Center Report, August
1979, pp. 16-22. MacIntyre reviews, in the light of his own deep historical knowledge,
without needing to enumerate cases, the intrinsically self-defeating character of efforts to
validate one's own starting point through increasingly profound attention to one's own
linguistic bootstraps.
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2. In my The Priestly Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984),
pp. 48f, I described six possible "adaptive strategies" with which a person naturally
responds to the discovery of the greater psychic power of the "wider world. "
3. The presentation of this material, at Bangor Theological Seminary in February 1988,
and to the Society of Christian Philosophers, at Lexington, Virginia 22 April 1989, could
not assume an awareness Qf the dialogue on related questions soon to be presented in an
exemplary way in Theology Today, April 1989, pp. 55-73. Accordingly, no effort is made
here to crossreference to that conversation, at the numerous places where that might be
done.
4. George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine; Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984).
5. J. Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church and
the University," Catholic Theological Society ofAmerica Proceedings, vol. 40 (1985), pp.
83-94. I am grateful to Gustafson for the authentic way in which he represents the
mainstream assumptions I here must challenge. My taking his strong statement as occasion
to orient my exposition of an alternative testifies to my respect for his unique contribution
to the work of our guild.
6. Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective (henceforth ETP) volume I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 74, citing MacIntyre, "God and the Theologians,"
Encounter (September 1963); reprinted in Against the Self Images of the Age (London:
Duckworth, 1971; Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1978), p. 23. Although
Gustafson testifies to awareness of nuance, his critique of the "sectarian" option still rests
on the disjunctive assumptions I am here challenging.
7. In ETP his understanding of "shared criteria" has come increasingly to mean a world
view centered in the natural sciences, whose dominion in our culture is more assumed
than argued. In Harlan R. Beckley and Charles M. Swezey, eds., James M. Gustafson s
Theocentric Ethics: Interpretations and Assessments, (Macon, GA: Mercer University
Press, 1988), p. 72, I collected some of his most trusting allusions to "science." He accuses
Lindbeck of reducing truth questions to the inner consistency of a particular community;
yet he replaces that with the same criterion writ larger, namely the world view of an
unspecified set of our cultured contemporaries. His argument in favor of his uniVersity
colleagues as preferred public is that "that location is an important one in our culture and
formative for many who pass through it," (Beckley/Swezey op. cit., p. 221). That is
certainly true of the university; it would be true too of the country club or the Ku Klux
Klan. My setting is also a university. Its being "important and formative" hardly suffices
to justify how one particular setting properly should function to validate "public" theological reformulations.
8. Loc. cit, I say "glancing"; although Gustafson names me, as if my views represented
the problem to which MacIntyre's quote pointed, his continuing exposition does not
converse further with my views. Gustafson characterizes my view as denominational,
although my The Politics ofJesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), which is all he cites,
is a synthesis of the work of mainline scripture scholars, and although he cites a catholic
scholar saying about the same thing. He says "All theology needs to be defined ... in
relation to this radical option," yet we know by reading on that he does not intend to do
that. Nothing in The Politics ofJesus was addressed to the dilemma of particularity. I have
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no special case against the ethical substance of Gustafson's magnum opus, which is not
dependent upon his argument against particularity.
9. Not recognizing that a given point needs to be argued is of course the prima facie
formal mark of claims appealing to "nature" or "reason."
10. Perhaps instead of the term "establishment," from the American political experience,
I should say "Christendom." "Christendom" identifies an epoch, an arrangement, as well
as a territory, when/where the adjustment between the political and the ecclesiastical elites
of the Mediterranean and European world was such that no other world view was
permitted. The task of theologians was to unpack the coherence of all known truth within
a world which was in principle under control. The heritage of pagan antiquity had been
baptized and found its place in the system. The fundamental imperative for the theologian
is to make sense to everyone; not to permit anyone to refuse to listen on the grounds of
some loyalty, perspective, or identity not shared by everyone.
11. I offered one fragment of such a critique in Beckley/Swezey, p. 86. It is disconcerting
how little attention Gustafson gives to the possibility that his new construction of a
particular version of theocentrism beyond historic Christian God language might need to
be sustained by argument.
12. This is the valid point of the Macintyre text cited note 1 above.
13. This is the pertinence of my introductory reference to the socio-psychic origins of
the appetite for a "wider warrant."
14. My use of the term Evangel in its original, etymological meaning does not mean to
enter the muddy modem debate in sociology and journalism about what "evangelicalism"
means.
15. Gustafson attributes the intelligibility/validity disjunction to Douglas Ottati; the
attribution is however inaccurate. In his Meaning and Method in H. Richard Niebuhr s
Theology (Washington University Press, 1982), Ottati begins by stating that intelligibility
and integrity are both imperative, and sets out to demonstrate that H. Richard Niebuhr
successfully held them together.
16. Ernst Troeltsch sought in his history of The Social Teachings of the Churches (1912;
definitive edition, Tiibingen, Mohr, 1923, ET London and New York: Allen and Unwin
and Macmillan, 1931) to make the noun "sect," as well as the adjective, descriptive, purely
formal, rather than pejorative. Gustafson returns to the pejorative mode.
17. In view of our contemporaries' overt preoccupation with how to communicate into
other cultures, it is striking how little attention is paid, anywhere in this discussion, to the
linguistic/cultural experience of the Christian world mission. Other faith communities are
alluded to at the outset but not treated in Gustafson's 1985 text. Much could be learned
from the writings of the missionary linguist Eugene Nida about communication between
communities with different language systems; notably his Message and Mission (New
York: Harper, 1960); Religion Across Cultures (New York: Harper, 1968); Toward a
Science of TrallSlating (Leiden: Brill, 1964); Language Structure and TrallSlation (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1975); and Meaning Across Cultures (Maryknoll: Orbis,
1981).
18. I noted in Beckley/Swezey (note 8 above), 8lf, how thin Gustafson's attention is to
the classical Reformed conception of sin as an epistemological factor. Cf. Merold
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Westphal's paper, "Taking Paul Seriously: Sin as an Epistemological Category," in
Thomas Flint (ed.) Christian Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press,
1990), pp. 200-26. The noetic effect of sin must mean at least the readiness to deal with
audience hostility as a mark of truth.
19. When Gustafson says "God is not a Christian God" it seems clear that he considers
the statement to be important, and to be directed against someone. What is not clear is
whether he means that statement to count as a true substantive proposition about a reality
once properly addressed as ABBA/JHWH, or as an analytical (i.e., tautologous) rule about
how to use the word "God" as a cipher, or as an a priori commitment to some concretely
available "broader-than-Christian" value community, or as something else. In the absence
of specification, such confident rhetorical use of the name of God is as substantively empty
as it is formally pretentious. The notion of Evangel says by definition that its convictions
are not only for Christians, that its God is for everybody.
20. Cf. my The Priestly Kingdom, pp. 49-54. Historians of dogma will note that it is
precisely in these texts that we find the seeds of Nicea, i.e., the first intimations of what
later came to be called a "high Christology," namely the very kinds of archaic, ontological
definition-spinning which the modern mind has trouble with. That is not what these texts
meant then. They do teach us, however, that the message gets "thicker," not thinner, by
entering new worlds. As Eugene Nida long ago discerned, (op. cit., 1975, pp. 199,251),
a good translation says more than the original.
21. Nor is there any reason either that for all followers the propositional description of
their new loyalties should have been or should need to be the same.
22. This does not mean that it would be wrong for that to happen sometimes, as it began
to be done a century later by the so-called apologetes. Yet if the apologetic mode takes
over as the only mode of evangelizing, it replaces proclaiming with brokering. It consecrates the host culture instead of challenging it.
23. Gustafson points repeatedly (e.g., ETP I: pp. 152,245 339; II: p. 34) to the plurality
of strands within scripture, and the plurality of modes of reading scriptures, as if that fact
were somehow to refute the notion of historic canonical accountability. Only against the
scholastic fundamentalist would that argument have any cogency. To posit univocality as
8 condition of coherence is an anti-historical hermeneutic.
24. I describe those ministerial roles in The Priestly Kingdom, pp. 28-34.

